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Some excerpts from the statement made on 19 May 1974 by the Prime Minister of Pakistan on the nuclear underground text explosion conducted by India on 18 May 1974

India has been at loggerheads, in one way or another, with practically all its neighbours. Most serious differences have been with Pakistan and China. As far as we are concerned, we set in train the process of normalizing relations with India at Simla two years ago and there has been a step by step progress in that direction. As far as China is concerned, it has officially declared that with the implementation of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971), it is looking forward to the establishment of normal relations with all States of the sub-continent. Unless India seeks to reverse this evolution we cannot see relevance of this nuclear exercise to the immediate political setting of the sub-continent.

Moreover, we must realize that the exercise of nuclear threat by a nuclear weapon power against a non-nuclear weapon country is something which affects not only the victim but also the entire international community, particularly the Great Powers. Let us not, therefore, feel that we cannot secure political counter measures against a potential nuclear threat from India. We shall not let ourselves be alone in facing this challenge. India has dynamited and shattered to pieces the non-Proliferation Treaty. This is bound to embolden Israel and South Africa to further work of demolition. It is not only we, therefore, but the Asian-African community that has been exposed to a new menace.

There is, therefore, no reason why Pakistan should abandon its efforts to explore the possibility of a political action against nuclear threat. In as much as proliferation of nuclear weapons is a danger to the whole world, the United Nations has a clear and pressing duty to address itself more vigorously to the question of credible security assurances against nuclear threat or blackmail to all non-nuclear weapons States. The existing assurances extended by the Security Council lack credibility. Nor can the United States - Soviet statement to act jointly to prevent nuclear war inspire sufficient confidence among victims of would-be nuclear aggressors. What is needed is a joint undertaking in the nature of an obligation by all the permanent members of the Security Council to act collectively or individually on behalf of the threatened State. In other words, a nuclear umbrella of all five Great Powers or, failing that, of at least one of them is the irreducible minimum of protection that is required to give States like Pakistan a real assurance of security against nuclear threat or blackmail.

It has to be understood by all concerned powers that Pakistan's anxiety in this respect cannot but be unparalleled. No two among the five great nuclear-weapon powers --United States, Soviet Union, China, France and Britain -- have had a history of confrontation and wars between them in contemporary times or in past remotely comparable to the relations between India and Pakistan. In barely a quarter century between 1947 and 1971, India has gone to war three times against Pakistan. Throughout this period India has spurned all possible methods of peaceful settlement of its disputes with Pakistan. The last war was the result of India's armed intervention in order to bring about disintegration of Pakistan. Against this background which is unique in the present age, we repeatedly warned the great powers and also Canada that India would betray its assurances and its bilateral agreement with Canada and explode a nuclear device in order to claim status of a nuclear-weapon power. These warnings went unheeded. Meanwhile over two decades India steadily acquired nuclear know-how, built plutonium device of the type it exploded in RAJASTHAN on Saturday, 18 May 1974. This production took place in Canada-India reactor which was supplied on the express understanding that it would be used for constructive purposes only. I am not surprised and hardly relieved that the Canadian Government has expressed itself as very disturbed by the announcement of the Indian explosion and has termed it as a severe setback to international efforts to prevent nuclear testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Such statements, while welcome in intent, cannot assuage our fears. Given the brutal fact of 18 May explosion, Pakistan cannot be expected to rest on technicalities and protocol. It would be unfair, indeed immoral, that India's flagrant violation of non-proliferation assurances should make nuclear-weapon powers resort to the double perversity of not only condoning it but also giving it a blessing by putting a stop or imposing restrictions on normal nuclear programmes of other States.

Indeed at this stage we are taking steps to secure a political insurance against India's use of nuclear threat and I can announce some of these steps; we are formally approaching the Secretary-General of the United Nations and I am also sending the Foreign Secretary to China, France and Britain to explain our position to their Governments. I am visiting the Soviet Union myself and will take up this question with the Soviet leaders. I have asked the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence to raise this issue at the CENTO meeting, Washington DC, and to hold urgent discussions with officials of the United States Government. He will thereafter go to Canada, which has made singular contribution to India's nuclear capability. I am also addressing letters to Heads of States and Governments of all nuclear weapons States.